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The brain is a prediction machine that cares about good 
and bad – Any implications for neuropragmatics?
Jos J. A. Van Berkum
Experimental pragmatics asks how people construct contextualized 
meaning in communication. So what does it mean for this field to add neuro- 
as a prefix to its name? After analyzing the options for any subfield of cogni-
tive science, I argue that neuropragmatics can and occasionally should go 
beyond the instrumental use of EEG or fMRI and beyond mapping classic 
theoretical distinctions onto Brodmann areas. In particular, if experimental 
pragmatics ‘goes neuro’, it should take into account that the brain evolved 
as a control system that helps its bearer negotiate a highly complex, rapidly 
changing and often not so friendly environment. In this context, the ability 
to predict current unknowns, and to rapidly tell good from bad, are essential 
ingredients of processing. Using insights from non-linguistic areas of cognitive 
neuroscience as well as from EEG research on utterance comprehension, I 
argue that for a balanced development of experimental pragmatics, these two 
characteristics of the brain cannot be ignored.*
Keywords: prediction, proactive brain, valence, affective system, cognitive 
neuroscience, EEG
1. Pragmatics goes neuro, but how far exactly? 
Pragmatics is often defined as the study of how linguistic prop-
erties and contextual factors interact in the interpretation of utter-
ances (Levinson 1983; Sperber & Noveck 2004). Pragmaticists ask 
fundamental questions about contextualized meaning in communi-
cative interaction – how does it work, how can it work, is there any 
systematicity to it that we can capture in a concise and illuminating 
way? Experimental pragmaticists pursue these questions by taking a 
processing perspective, i.e., by asking how contextualized meaning is 
constructed in the minds of actual language users (e.g., Sauerland & 
Yatsushiro 2009; Sperber & Noveck 2004; Noveck & Reboul 2008). So 
what about neuropragmatics? What’s with the prefix? 
The introduction of neuroscience ideas in experimental pragmat-
ics echoes a wider development in cognitive science, where classic 
information-theoretic ideas about the fundamental irrelevance of the 
specific ‘hardware’ (e.g., Fodor 1980; Newell 1982; Pylyshyn 1984) 
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are giving way to a perspective in which the brain takes centre stage. 
However, as in other subfields of cognitive science that gradually 
begin to mind the brain, the prefix neuro- does not stand for a single 
approach. To see how it affects the endeavor of experimental prag-
matics, it may be useful to first examine what neuro- can stand for in 
a cognitive science subfield anyway. 
Neuro Lite approach. Here, researchers simply replace ‘mind’ 
by ‘brain’ (or ‘mind/brain’) to then carry on with their classic cogni-
tive science business as usual, reasoning about the mind in terms of 
rules and representations, box-and-arrow flowchart models and, occa-
sionally, explicit computational models. Even researchers who once 
deeply subscribed to the irrelevant hardware idea (‘methodological 
solipsism’, Fodor 1980) nowadays probably occasionally refer to the 
brain instead of the mind. But of course, apart from rhetorics, nothing 
really changes. 
Instrumental approach. At the next level, neuroscience methods 
are used as additional tools in one’s search for the functional architec-
ture of the mind, without fundamentally caring about the brain. For 
example, one might use electroencephalography (EEG) or functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to settle an issue about whether 
two putative information processing stages (e.g., computing sentence 
meaning and speaker meaning) interact, operate independently, or 
are instantiations of the same mental process operating on different 
representations. The research questions are entirely formulated within 
the realms of classic cognitive science, and neuroscience measures are 
solely used to generate additional constraints on cognitive theorizing.
Modestly ontological approach. Here, the research agenda is still 
predominantly set by classic cognitive theories, but specific research 
questions now also target the brain. A good example of this is to ask 
about ‘the neural substrate’ of some process – say, pragmatic inferenc-
ing – by means of fMRI. Most commonly, what people try to do here is 
map their current classic flowchart (or, more rarely, computational) 
thinking onto systems-level neuroscience ideas, where networks of 
brain areas are also conceived of in terms of processing components 
and communication between them. So, instead of simply speaking 
about an ‘inferencing system’, terms like ‘medial frontal cortex’ and 
‘Brodmann area 10’, as well as what we know about those brain areas 
from other work, also enter theorizing. 
Deeply ontological approach. On the reasonable assumption that 
general principles of brain functioning are relevant to specific models 
of information processing, the research agenda here is also partly 
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set by knowledge about the brain and how it evolved. For example, if 
top-down prediction and rapid valuation are fundamental systems-
level operating principles of the brain, one would want to somehow 
accommodate (or at least consider accommodating) these ideas into 
one’s thinking about mental processes X, Y and Z. Note that this is 
not a simple reductionist perspective in which all theories should 
be couched in the language of neurons and synapses – as argued by 
many (e.g., Marr 1982; Newell 1982), with a system as complex and 
layered as the brain, higher levels of description are simply essen-
tial. It’s just that the specific theories at hand also take into account 
insights generated by modern cognitive neuroscience.1 
So, what about neuropragmatics, then? Although particular 
research projects can incorporate aspects of each of these approaches, 
virtually all neuropragmatic studies so far, including my own, have 
‘gone neuro’ in an instrumental and/or modestly ontological sense 
only. Is that bad? No. There is nothing inherently suboptimal in 
using Event Related Potentials (ERPs) to validate cognitive models, 
and in mapping such models onto brain areas – in fact, cognitive 
models can give much-needed direction to what otherwise would be 
mere shotgun empiricism with researchers staring at overwhelming 
neuroscientific data sets. Furthermore, research fields are always 
historically determined as well as in flux, and if, say, a predominantly 
instrumental neuro- approach is what currently works best within a 
particular field, given the goals it has set for itself, that’s OK. Having 
said that, it is also obvious that any field dealing with mental proc-
esses would do wise to at least occasionally take a deep ontological 
neuro- approach, that is, reconsider its research agenda in the light of 
how we think the brain works, and why it works that way. After all, 
if additional insights from cognitive neuroscience are relevant to your 
concerns, why not enjoy them?
In the remainder of this paper, I’ll make a case for the rel-
evance to experimental pragmatics of two themes that are strongly 
emerging in cognitive neuroscience. One is the growing realization 
that the brain is a prediction machine. The second is that part of the 
brain’s success is that it rapidly computes good and bad, or valence, 
to negotiate the physical and social environment. My intention is to 
convince at least some experimental pragmaticists that for a bal-
anced development of their field, prediction and valence cannot be 
ignored. It’s not that experimental pragmaticists should think about 
these two issues all the time. But at least some of them should do so 
some of the time.
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2. Prediction
2.1. The brain is a fundamentally proactive device
We can find predictions in every corner of cognition. In motor 
behavior, for example, model-based predictions of the sensory conse-
quences of intended actions are a crucial part of effective motor con-
trol (e.g., Wolpert & Flanagan 2001), and context plays an important 
role in selecting the right forward model. It is this sort of context-sen-
sitive prediction that helps you lift an open carton of milk gracefully, 
and causes you to overshoot when lifting an empty carton that you 
thought was full. It is also behind that strange sensation when you 
step on an escalator that doesn’t work.
In vision, we know from research on representational momentum 
that if you see a series of static pictures that together imply motion, 
such as an athlete jumping or a rocket launching itself into space, 
your brain prepares for the next picture in a way that betrays a for-
ward model of the unfolding movement (Thornton & Hubbard 2002). 
Other work has shown that a crude initial analysis of the visual stim-
ulus leads people to rapidly predict what they are about to see in full, 
and such predictions are fed back into early visual areas (e.g., Bar 
2007; 2009a; Kveraga et al. 2007; Summerfield & Egner 2009). As in 
the motor domain, predictions are contextualized, such that the same 
fuzzy shape can leads people to predict, say, a hairdryer in a hair-
salon context, but a water pistol in the context of children playing in 
the garden on a hot summer day.
And there’s much more. At a somewhat more deliberate level, 
for example, we routinely use our Theory of Mind skills to predict 
what other people might do (Frith & Frith 2010). We plan everything 
from papers to summer vacations to military campaigns, and most of 
us continuously ruminate about our future. Even though we do not 
always put it to the best of uses, and although our deliberate antici-
pation skills have definite room for improvement (Covey 1989), we’re 
all in all a pretty proactive species.
What ties all these observations together is the growing realiza-
tion that a primary function of the brain is to predict its environment 
in space and time (Bar 2007; 2009a), and that the purpose of long-
term memory is precisely to support such prediction (Schacter et al. 
2007; Schooler & Anderson 1997). In neuroscience, the classic view 
of the brain as a fundamentally bottom-up device that hierarchically 
builds complex percepts by piecing together aspects of sensory input 
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(e.g., from simple circular receptive fields to line segments to faces) is 
rapidly giving way to a very different perspective:
The brain is no longer viewed as a transformer of ambient sensations 
into cognition, but a generator of predictions and inferences that inter-
prets experience according to subjective biases and statistical accounts 
of past encounters (Mesulam 2008: 368).
In line with this change in perspective, models of detailed brain 
function are increasingly couched in terms of predictive coding and 
minimizing prediction error (e.g., Friston 2005; Mehta 2001; Rao & 
Ballard 1999; Summerfield et al. 2006). In a recent and influential 
theory of evoked brain response (Friston 2005), for example, perception 
is modelled as hierarchical Bayesian inference, with forward models 
at each level of the cortical hierarchy predicting the input at the lower 
level, and with lower level systems sending prediction error signals up 
the hierarchy, for short-term adjustment as well as learning. In this 
perspective, the brain is essentially making sense of its environment 
by predicting what the latter should look like, given the acquired and/or 
genetically hardwired models of how the environment behaved before. 
Important to current concerns, neuroscience is moving towards 
predictive coding models of brain function for several functional rea-
sons. One is that classic hierarchical bottom-up coding cannot deliver 
the speedy perceptions that real brains do (Mesulam 2008). A second, 
deeper reason is that the raw environmental signal is just too ambig-
uous and complex to deal with in a bottom-up fashion (Bar 2007; 
Friston 2005) – only predictive forward models allow us to segment, 
select and stabilize input so that we perceive stability and coher-
ence in our environment (Bar 2007). So in all, our brains are not just 
proactive because it pays to anticipate upcoming events in a complex 
dynamic world. They are also proactive because the input would oth-
erwise simply be too difficult to deal with efficiently.
2.2. Prediction in language comprehension
Given that language comprehension is realized by the brain and, 
moreover, is bound to recruit many evolutionarily pre-existing brain 
systems (e.g., Marcus 2008; Christiansen & Chater 2008; Levinson 
2006), the above observations would lead one to expect that language 
comprehension is also strongly proactive. However, psycholinguistic 
research on sentence comprehension has long been dominated by the 
idea that language is so different from our other faculties that it just 
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has to be subserved by uniquely adapted special-purpose hardware. 
Furthermore, if language is a generative system that allows people 
to express just about anything at any given moment, how could pre-
diction ever work anyway? Wouldn’t the system more often be wrong 
than right? And, importantly, wouldn’t the total costs of being wrong 
be prohibitive? Wouldn’t it just be better to wait until the input has 
fully unfolded?
Ideas such as these have prevented most processing-oriented 
language comprehension researchers from considering prediction as 
a central feature of the architecture (see Altmann 1997; Elman 1990; 
Federmeier & Kutas 1999 for notable exceptions). But when we look 
for prediction, we can find it in language comprehension just as well. 
For example, ERP experiments from our lab have revealed that, as 
they read or listen to an unfolding utterance, people routinely use 
their knowledge of the wider discourse context to predict specific 
upcoming words. In one of these studies (Van Berkum et al. 2005), 
participants listened to (Dutch) mini-stories such as (1a), which in a 
paper-and-pencil cloze test were predominantly completed with one 
particular critical noun (in this case, painting, the Dutch translation 
of which is a neuter-gender word). To test whether such discourse-
based lexical prediction would also occur ‘on-line’ as part of real-time 
language comprehension, the EEG participants would at this point 
first hear a gender-inflected adjective whose syntactic gender either 
agreed with the anticipated noun, as in (1b), or did not agree with 
this expected noun, as in (1c).
(1) a. The burglar had no trouble locating the secret family safe. Of 
course, it was situated behind a…
 b. … bigneu but rather unobtrusive paintingneu
 c. … bigcom but rather unobtrusive bookcasecom
Relative to the gender-congruent prenominal adjective in (1b), the 
gender-incongruent adjective in (1c) elicited a small but reliable ERP 
effect right at the inflection, illustrated in Fig. 1. Because this predic-
tion effect hinges on the idiosyncratic (hence memorized) syntactic 
gender of an expected but not yet presented noun, it suggests that dis-
course-level information can indeed lead people to anticipate specific 
upcoming words ‘on-line’, as a local sentence unfolds. In addition, the 
fact that such prediction can be probed via syntactic gender agreement 
suggests that the syntactic properties of those anticipated ‘ghost’ words 
can immediately begin to interact with locally unfolding syntactic con-
straints, such as the gender inflection on a prenominal adjective. 
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Figure 1. Left: The ERP effect to spoken adjectives whose morphosyntactic gen-
der suffix did (solid line) or did not (dotted line) match discourse-based expecta-
tions for specific upcoming nouns (e.g., the neuter Dutch equivalent of painting, 
preceded by a prenominal adjective with common gender suffix). Right: The N400 
effect elicited by the actual spoken nouns presented later in the sentence, with a 
coherent but less expected noun (e.g., bookcase, dotted line) eliciting a much larger 
N400 than the discourse-predictable noun (e.g., painting, solid line). Acoustic onset 
of the critical suffix (left) or later noun (right) is at 0 ms. 
In follow-up research (Otten & Van Berkum 2008; 2009; Otten 
et al. 2007), we examined whether these discourse-based predictions 
were being driven by a precise message-level representation of the dis-
course (as had been assumed by Van Berkum et al. 2005), or whether 
they could be reduced to a somewhat simpler predictive mechanism 
involving scenario-based or convergent lexical priming (e.g., burglar, 
safe and behind jointly predicting painting, regardless of the specific 
assertions being made in the story). The ERP results actually sug-
gest that in the agreement-sensitive paradigms used here, predictions 
critically hinge on the precise message conveyed so far. Moreover, it is 
not merely highly skilled language users that exhibit such discourse-
based anticipation: readers with rather low verbal working memory 
do so just as well (Otten & Van Berkum 2009).
Research in another comprehension paradigm (Koornneef & Van 
Berkum 2006; Van Berkum et al. 2007) also suggests that language 
users routinely look ahead as they make their way through an utter-
ance. In this paradigm we made use of implicit causality, stereotypi-
cal knowledge associated with verbs like praise or apologize. When 
asked to complete a fragment such as David praised Linda because..., 
readers and listeners will be inclined to continue with something 
about Linda, e.g., …because she had done well. However, after David 
apologized to Linda because..., people tend to continue with some-
thing about David instead. In ‘person-1 verb-ed person-2 because...’ 
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constructions, interpersonal verbs like praise and apologize thus 
supply information about whose behaviour or state is the more likely 
immediate cause of the event at hand. In our experiments, we tested 
whether this probabilistic information can rapidly lead readers to 
anticipate, on the fly, about whom the sentence will continue in the 
because-clause. We did this by occasionally continuing the because-
clause with an expectation-inconsistent referential pronoun (as in 
2b), and by comparing the processing at this pronoun to its expecta-
tion-consistent control (2a). 
(2)  a. Linda praised David because he… 
  b. David praised Linda because he… 
Figure 2. ERPs to singular pronouns whose gender-marking was consistent (solid 
line) or inconsistent (dotted line) with the implicit causality bias of a preceding 
verb. Bias-inconsistent pronouns elicit a P600 effect, suggesting that the seman-
tic/referential bias briefly caused readers to blame the morphosyntax. Onset of the 
written pronoun is at 0 ms.
Expectation-inconsistent pronouns such as in (2b) indeed came 
as an unpleasant surprise, causing readers to slow down right at 
or shortly after the critical word (Koornneef & Van Berkum 2006). 
Furthermore, as displayed in Fig. 2, the processing costs of expec-
tation-inconsistent pronouns also emerged in ERPs, as an early 
P600 effect (Van Berkum et al. 2007). Taken together, these vari-
ous processing costs of bias-inconsistent pronouns show that people 
were at that point in the sentence indeed expecting information 
about somebody else. Furthermore, the observation of a P600 effect is 
consistent with the idea that as readers encountered the verb, their 
expectation for the sentence to continue with something about the 
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person being praised was so strong that an expectation-inconsistent 
pronoun was actually briefly taken as a morpho-syntactic error (see 
Van Berkum et al. 1999, for a similar phenomenon).
The above two paradigms were specifically designed to probe for 
anticipation. However, standard semantic anomaly N400 effects in 
utterances such He buttered the bread with socks (Kutas & Hillyard 
1980) can also be taken to reflect the workings of a predictive brain. 
According to a widely shared model of the N400 (Kutas & Federmeier 
2000; Kutas et al. 2006; Federmeier 2007; Lau et al. 2008; Van 
Berkum 2009), the amplitude of the N400 reflects the computational 
resources used in retrieving the relatively invariant ‘coded’ meaning(s) 
stored in semantic long-term memory for the word at hand, with a 
more negative (bigger) N400 indicating a more costly retrieval proc-
ess and a less negative (smaller) N400 reflecting less costly retrieval. 
Importantly, such retrieval always occurs in a specific context, and 
aspects of that context can predict or ‘prime’ the relevant meaning, 
such that retrieval becomes easier when the word comes along. So, 
combined with your knowledge about the world, He buttered the bread 
with… leads you to anticipate, say, marmalade or peanut butter, but 
not socks or cars. When the critical word then comes along, such pre-
dictions help retrieval of the former, but hinder that of the latter.
In the specific variant of this N400 model that I’ve recent-
ly argued for elsewhere (the Multiple-cause Intensified Retrieval 
account, Van Berkum 2009), a wide variety of information sources 
can give rise to expectations against which the next word comes in, 
including (a) associatively or semantically related prime words, (b) 
scenario-based knowledge about the world activated by (one or more 
words in) the preceding text, (c) a mental representation of the sen-
sory context, e.g., visual or auditory scene, (d) the coded and contextu-
ally enriched meaning – “what is said” – computed for the unfolding 
sentence heard so far, (e) the Gricean speaker meaning – “what is 
meant” – inferred for the unfolding sentence heard so far, (f) a mental 
model of the situation being discussed, and (g) some metalinguistic 
representation of the discourse, e.g., its genre and register, the inter-
locutors involved, and the goals being pursued. All of this can raise 
conceptual expectations or predictions that can be met by the next 
word to varying degrees, with a better fit giving a smaller N400.
The studies reviewed above are by no means the only ones dem-
onstrating prediction in language comprehension, and clear evidence 
for anticipatory comprehension can also be found elsewhere (e.g., 
Altmann & Mirkovic 2009; Delong et al. 2005; De Ruiter et al. 2006; 
Kamide 2008; Federmeier 2007; Federmeier & Kutas 1999; Trueswell 
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& Tanenhaus 2005; Wicha et al. 2004; see Coulson & Lovett this 
issue, for a recent example involving context-based speech act antici-
pation). Readers and listeners don’t just passively sit back and enjoy 
the show – they continuously predict what their interlocutor is going 
to say or talk about next.
2.3. Should pragmaticists care?
Is this of relevance to the enterprise of experimental pragmatics? 
Yes, I think it is. First of all, experimental pragmatics is about how 
people combine code and context to construct non-natural meaning. If 
context allows one to anticipate meaning and predict upcoming bits of 
code, this must surely be an important part of the language process-
ing story. Of course, as argued more extensively elsewhere (Van 
Berkum forthcoming), we’ll need to flesh out what exactly is being 
anticipated (e.g., communicative ‘moves’, specific upcoming signs, 
developments in the world under discussion), via which mechanisms 
(cost-free memory retrieval, more effortful forward modelling of one’s 
interlocutor, etc…), how predictions at one level percolate to another 
one (e.g., from a specific communicative move to a plausible upcoming 
word), and whether there is any deep distinction between predicting 
future states or current unknowns (compare The next word will prob-
ably be X to One unmentioned but probably relevant feature of Y is Z). 
But prediction does change the name of the game: if you can guess 
what’s missing (in physical or conceptual space) and/or coming up (in 
time), your processing can to some extent run in ‘verification mode’.
Second, the predictive nature of our brains seems clearly relevant 
to specific issues in pragmatics. Here are a few promising, sometimes 
even obvious candidates.
Turn-taking. Linguistic communication is a collaborative enter-
prise (Clark 1996; Tomasello 2008), and when people work together, 
they need to coordinate. To coordinate effectively, however, interlocu-
tors have to anticipate what the other will do. In conversation, one 
clear example of this is turn-taking. On average, speakers around the 
world tend to start speaking within only a few hundred milliseconds 
after the end of their interlocutor’s turn (Stivers et al. 2009; De Ruiter 
et al. 2006). Because the average gap between consecutive turns is a 
lot shorter than the average time needed to go from communicative 
intention to actual overt speech, speakers must prepare their turn 
before that of their interlocutor has ended. Under such circumstances, 
if you want to make sure that you start speaking when your interlocu-
tor is done, you simply need to predict the end of his or her turn. 
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Stable patterns of coordination. Pragmatics has a rich history 
of finding and describing recurrent patterns of linguistic coordina-
tion. One is the adjacency pair, the systematic coupling of question 
and answer, offer and acceptance, or greeting and greeting (Levinson 
1983; Schegloff & Sacks 1973). Conversation is strongly shaped by 
fine-grained expectations about what is and what is not a valid next 
move (Goffman 1981; Enfield 2009). Genre works in the same way, in 
that it raises fine-grained expectations about what is said when by 
whom and how (Steen forthcoming). Understanding how adjacency 
pairs and genres constrain real-time linguistic communication clearly 
requires thinking about predictive mechanisms.
Markedness-based inferencing. Speakers can exploit the com-
prehender’s expectations for how things are typically expressed (in a 
particular sequence of moves, in a particular genre) by deliberately 
violating those predictions. The use of marked expressions (e.g., using 
the blue cuboid block instead of the blue cube, or describing a piece of 
art as challenging instead of just good or bad) is a fundamental way 
for speakers to guide the comprehender’s search for interpretations. 
This idea is captured, for example, in Levinson’s reanalysis of the 
Gricean maxims of conversation, notably heuristic 3 (“what is said 
in an abnormal way, isn’t normal”; Levinson 2000). But for this to 
work in practice, people need to routinely predict the normal state of 
affairs, and do so effectively.
Context-dependent enrichment. In the debate on whether prag-
matic enrichment requires ‘dumb’ but rapid default heuristics (e.g., 
Generalized Conversational Implicatures, Levinson 2000) or not 
(Wilson & Sperber 2004), one argument provided for such heuristics 
is that idiosyncratic context (e.g., the speaker’s perspective, and what 
is in common ground) is deemed to be too rich and complex to rapidly 
help in fixing meaning. However, to the extent that our brains are 
great at having relevant enriching information ready at just the right 
time (possibly even in terms of what is in common ground and what is 
not), context-sensitive customized inferences about what the speaker 
intends to convey may not be so hard to draw (Van Berkum 2009). In 
this way, prediction directly bears on the debate.
The interpretive background. A related example concerns what 
is in the interpretive background as words come in. Formalisms 
such as DRT (Kamp & Reyle 1993; Geurts & Beaver 2007) have no 
trouble postulating, say, [x; knight(x)] and [y; dragon(y)] as explicitly 
introduced discourse entities in the domain under discussion. But of 
course, in terms of the real interpretive background those symbols are 
only the tip of the iceberg. For example, they also call to mind a fairy 
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tale genre, specific event scenario’s (often with a fair princess, some 
bold behavior by the knight, and a dead dragon in the end), and even 
specific concepts (e.g., sword, fire, courage, etc.) and words (such that 
the reader is less surprised at slayed than at faxed). The relatively 
inexpensive prediction afforded by long-term memory mechanisms 
in the brain may hold the key to the problem of how knowledge-rich 
information-processing systems tend to bring their vast background 
knowledge to bear on local processing, without clogging up.
These examples suggest that prediction, as a processing concept, 
is relevant to many specific issues in pragmatics. But there is also a 
somewhat deeper parallel between the central pragmatic question of 
how context and code interact in communication, and the theoretical 
neuroscience observations alluded to in the beginning of this paper. 
Remember that one important reason why neuroscience is moving 
towards predictive coding models of brain function is that, at least in 
visual perception, classic hierarchical bottom-up coding cannot deliv-
er the speedy perceptions that real brains do – given the response 
speed of neurons and the complexity of the outside world, there 
simply isn’t enough time to build things up from scratch (Mesulam 
2008). This insight actually provides an interesting opposite to one of 
Levinson’s arguments for code-based default heuristics (Generalized 
Conversational Implicatures, GCIs; Levinson 2000). In the classic 
computational frameworks of cognitive science, context-based com-
putation is problematic, causing delays and combinatorial explosion. 
In such a framework, context-free code-based default heuristics can 
be assumed to speed things up. However, in at least some corners of 
the brain it’s not the context that is causing delays, it’s the context-
free object-driven processing that is too slow – only with context can 
acceptable response times be achieved! If this also holds for language 
processing, rich context is not a barrier, but the key to speed.
Furthermore, if the raw environmental signal is just far too 
ambiguous and complex for the brain to deal with in a bottom-up fash-
ion (Bar 2007; Friston 2005), and only predictive forward models allow 
us to segment, select and stabilize input so that we perceive stability 
and coherence in our environment (Bar 2007), this ‘reverse processing’ 
view may provide for a fresh perspective on the semantics-pragmatics 
interface. A classic and seductive idea about how semantic and prag-
matic knowledge is brought to bear in actual language processing is 
that communicative meaning is first coarsely determined by the code 
(semantics), and then all remaining gaps are filled in by contextual 
factors (pragmatics). However, if the proximal input and/or the associ-
ated conceptual knowledge stored in long-term memory (i.e., the code) 
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is really too ambiguous and complex to deliver stable representations, 
predictive context may well be essential to co-define (segment, sta-
bilize) the code. Arguments about the fundamental indeterminacy of 
the code have already been made in pragmatics a long time ago (e.g., 
Clark 1996; Kempson 2001). But they now receive support from a per-
haps unexpected corner: the neuroscience of perception.
Here’s another take on this last point. To the extent that lin-
guistic tokens simply instantiate a communicative move that was 
expected anyway, such as the uptake of an invitation, we will need 
to reconsider the classic idea that language comprehension proceeds 
‘upwards’ through signal-driven semantic memory retrieval, semantic 
composition, contextual enrichment, and implicature recovery. After 
all, if we can already reasonably guess what the speaker meaning will 
be, information can flow the other way too. Also, if we have partial 
evidence that the currently unfolding move is an uptake (e.g., because 
somebody nods approvingly), this can constrain our perception of 
some of the linguistic signs used to realize the move, making sounds 
like o… or ye… more likely to be the onsets of okay and yeah than of 
open and yesterday.
Of course, guesses can go wrong, and new, unexpected things can 
be said. But that is not a sign of a fundamentally flawed architecture. 
In theoretical neuroscience, the concept of prediction error is now cen-
tral to accounts of learning and attention allocation (e.g., Bar 2007; 
Friston 2005). And so it may be in language comprehension: it is only 
because we expect things that a particular message or its delivery is 
marked, and as such worthy of extra attention and additional inferenc-
ing. In other words: predictions are even useful when they are wrong.
Let me be clear: the claim is not that people working in the field 
of pragmatics have been totally oblivious to prediction – it is hard to 
think about adjacency pairs or genres, for example, without implicitly 
thinking about expectation, anticipation, prediction. But that’s the 
point – these concepts are usually implicit. I think there is much to 
gain from considering their role in a more explicit way.
3. Valence
3.1. The brain cares about good and bad
As argued in the beginning of this paper, ‘going neuro’ can 
mean more than just using ERPs and fMRI, and talking about 
Brodmann areas. Importantly, it ideally also involves being guided 
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by knowledge about what the brain is for, and how it achieves this 
goal. Well, the brain of Homo Sapiens is a fancy and highly flexible 
control system, evolved to make us more successful in negotiating 
a complex dynamic physical and social environment. Now, having 
eyes and legs and hands and stomachs is certainly useful too. But if 
you cannot use the visual information to make sensible decisions as 
to where to move and what to grab (or leave alone), you’re not mak-
ing the best of those facilities. That’s where the brain as a control 
system comes in.
For a long time, cognitive scientists have viewed the brain as a 
knowledge-level system (Newell 1982), whose specialty was to com-
pute accurate representations of the world, and store the invariant 
aspects of them in long-term memory for better future computation. 
Translated to psycholinguistics, this computer-inspired perspective 
has led scientists to for example ask how comprehenders construct 
a syntactic representation, derive a proposition, and update the 
situation model. In experimental pragmatics, we similarly ask how 
comprehenders use context to disambiguate word sense, compute 
reference, understand metaphorical expressions, derive conversa-
tional implicatures and compute other aspects of speaker meaning 
(see, e.g., the various papers in this special issue). It’s all about 
knowledge, about how listeners work out the bits of information 
that speakers want to pass on to them, and about how speakers 
work out what listeners already know, so that a few less bits need 
to be transferred.
However, the brain is not a scientist analyzing the environ-
ment in a dispassionate way. Brains care about good and bad, about 
valence. And for good reason: staying away from bad stuff and 
approaching good stuff helps keep you alive, healthy, and attractive 
– and as such, it tends to help you generate offspring with the same 
useful inclinations. Special neural circuitry has evolved to handle 
valence in the brain, in a network that includes, amongst others, the 
amygdala, prefrontal cortex, the insula, cingulate cortex, the hypoth-
alamus, nucleus accumbens, and the brainstem (see e.g., Cacioppo 
et al. 2004; Dalgleish 2004; Damasio 2004; Davidson & Irwin 1999; 
Dolan 2002; Ledoux 2000). This ‘emotional brain’ or ‘affect system’ 
– the term ‘limbic system’ has gone out of fashion – is central to mak-
ing you feel good or bad about certain things, and to as such guide 
your behavior in accordance with the goals set by biological evolution 
and/or you as a goal-directed individual.
Because the stakes are high, parts of the affective system 
respond extremely rapidly to positive or negative stimuli, some-
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times within a mere 100 to 150 ms (e.g., Grandjean & Scherer 2008; 
Pizzagalli et al. 2002; Schupp et al. 2004; Smith et al. 2003). And 
what makes these responses interesting to current concerns is that 
they feed back into the perceptual system, to enhance ‘early’ process-
ing of the input in visual or auditory cortex (‘emotional attention’, 
Dolan 2002; Barrett & Bar 2009; Vuilleumier & Huang 2009). That 
is, what happens is that strongly valenced input very rapidly engages 
the affect system, which in turn boosts perceptual processing of those 
stimuli in relevant cortical areas, leading to stronger and – in terms 
of situation model updating as well as actual behavior – more impact-
ful representations.
Valence is not just about heightened attention when we see 
something attractive, or hear a potential threat approach. Classically 
‘central’ cognitive abilities like reasoning, judgement and decision 
making are also heavily influenced by the affect system (Dolan 2002; 
Damasio 1994; Gigerenzer 2007). According to the somatic marker 
hypothesis (Damasio 1994), for example, affective connotations made 
available by ventromedial prefrontal cortex are vital to decision-mak-
ing, illustrated by the fact that people with lesions in this area are 
generally poor decision makers. The emerging idea in cognitive neu-
roscience is that the affect system is not just there to make us flee or 
fight, but to help us value – and hence reason adaptively with – infor-
mation relative to our goals. In this perspective, rather than being 
framed as the irrational enemy of knowledge and reason, valence and 
the associated affect can be said to ‘ignite’ information that would oth-
erwise be leaving us cold and motionless.
In addition to the effects of valence associated with specific input 
and specific ideas, there is good evidence that general background 
mood plays an important role in modulating the style of information 
processing (Ashby et al. 1999; Clore & Huntsinger 2007; Rowe et al. 
2007). For example, in a bad mood people have a narrower focus of 
attention and they rely less on heuristics (scripts, social stereotypes, 
etc.) in reasoning and recall, whereas in a good mood their attentional 
focus tends to be broader and their reliance on heuristics goes up. The 
exact mechanisms at work here are heavily under debate, and some-
times related to the evolutionarily relevant regulation of exploratory 
behavior (e.g., Bar 2009b). But the phenomena are very clear: mood 
influences cognition in non-trivial ways.
Because of all these phenomena, but certainly also because 
of evolutionary concerns – the brain is there to keep its bearers 
alive in a dangerous world – attention in cognitive neuroscience 
is increasingly directed to the affect system and its interface with 
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classic ‘cold’ cognition (e.g., the majority of talks and all four key-
note speeches at a recent cognitive neuroscience meeting, the 49th 
Annual Meeting of the Society of Psychophysiological Research 
(SPR 2009) in Berlin, were about affect-related topics). As one neu-
roscientist has put it: 
Inclusion of work on emotion within the cognitive framework can help 
rescue this field from its sterile approach of the mind as an information-
processing device that lacks goals, strivings, desires, fears, and hopes 
(LeDoux 2000: 157).
Equally important in the developing interest in how cognition 
relates to affect is the increasing realization that brain systems oper-
ate in a far less modular fashion than once assumed. In the words of 
another neuroscientist: 
The extensive structural and functional interconnectivity of brain parts 
indicate that no cell, cell assembly, area, region, or system is wholly 
autonomous. Purely language functions (if such exist), therefore, seem 
to be part of a much larger, apparently integrated system, and it may 
not be prudent to study them in isolation from perception, attention, 
memory, and action (Kutas 2006: 293).
 
3.2. Valence as part of meaning
So why should people interested in contextualized meaning care 
about all this? A first reason has to do with the grounding of lexical-
semantic content in experience. There’s a lot of talk these days about 
grounding symbol meaning. But whereas perception and action sys-
tems are usually seen as primary sources of ‘semantic primitives’, the 
affective system is not often considered as a useful ground. This seems 
unwise, for the core affective system is fully up and running – and a 
source of deep experience – at birth (and even before). This makes it 
an ideal candidate for the grounding of meaning.
The case is most obvious, but also most trivial, for emotion words 
(joy, sadness, anger): here, a true understanding of the meaning must 
simply be codetermined by personal affective experience. Because we 
all live in the same world and carry around roughly the same affect 
system, personal meanings constructed for these words will strongly 
overlap, to an extent that will make any semanticist happy. But 
what about the meaning of words like euthanasia, or abortion? Here, 
one’s affective response may well differ radically, as a function of the 
moral-ethical environment in which one was raised, and the personal 
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value system that emerged as a result. Hence, whereas the word 
euthanasia may well trigger a slightly negative affective response in a 
conservative Christian, the same word may elicit a (partly) more posi-
tive response in those who have come to associate it with compassion 
and elementary human rights. Is that part of the word’s meaning for 
that person? Yes, I do not see why not.
We recently explored the processing of value-dependent meaning 
by recording EEG as respondents with opposing moral value systems 
filled out an opinion poll on morally relevant issues (Van Berkum et 
al. 2009). Critical statements were designed to be strongly consistent 
or inconsistent with the average moral value system of members of a 
relatively strict Dutch Christian party, referred to here as SC-group 
respondents. Examples (with the critical word in italics for expository 
purposes): 
(3)  I think euthanasia is an acceptable course of action.
(4)  Watching TV to relax is wrong in my opinion.
(5)  If my child were homosexual, I’d find this easy to accept. 
We presented these statements to SC-group respondents and to 
non-Christian respondents with sufficiently contrasting moral value 
systems (NC-group), and asked them to indicate their agreement on 
a four-point agree – disagree scale. We measured EEG during initial 
reading only, before any response was given.
Figure 3. ERPs to value-
consistent (solid line) and 
value-inconsistent (dotted 
line) critical words in opi-
nion poll statements, for 
members of a relatively 
strict Dutch Christian 
party (left), as well as a 
non-religious control group 
with opposing moral value 
systems. Morally objectio-
nable words are rapidly 
perceived as emotionally 
aversive (LPP effect) and 
affect the ongoing seman-
tic analysis (N400 effect); 
the two effects partially 
overlap. Written word 
onset is at 0 ms.
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As can be seen in Fig. 3, words where the unfolding composition-
al meaning of the statement began to clash with the reader’s moral 
value system (e.g., for SC-group respondents, I think euthanasia is 
an acceptable…) elicited an immediate brain response, starting at 
200 ms after the critical word.2 Part of the neural response was an 
ERP effect commonly elicited by emotionally arousing stimuli (the so-
called “Late Positive Potential”). The result of interest here, however, 
is that for both groups of respondents, morally offending words also 
elicited a small N400 effect, with a classic centroparietal maximum, 
and peaking at exactly 400 ms. This suggests that a person’s values 
are not just brought to bear on language processing extremely rap-
idly, but that the associated affective evaluation actually modulates 
some aspect of the language-driven early semantic analysis itself.
Whether this bears on experimental pragmatics depends on how 
the subject matter of that field is defined. For one, doesn’t the idi-
osyncratic nature of such value-dependent affective meaning simply 
remove it from the concerns of linguistics? In the context of a univer-
sal communication system, shouldn’t we just be talking about univer-
sally shared aspects of meaning? Well, drawing the line around uni-
versally shared meaning is a legitimate way of defining one’s object of 
study. Having said that, in the brains of actual language users, mean-
ing is always idiosyncratically grounded in experience (even if it is the 
experience of words occurring in the context of other words, such as 
with learning about the world through definitions and novels). Hence, 
if you are interested in how the brain constructs context-dependent 
meaning, why leave value-dependent affective connotations of words 
like euthanasia or abortion out of the picture? For sure, such con-
text-dependence may make communication a little harder. But that 
doesn’t mean it’s not real.
One could also point out that experimental pragmatics is about 
the construction of ‘speaker’ meaning, whereas these value-dependent 
effects seem to be about ‘listener’ meaning, the assumed downstream 
consequence of having successfully inferred speaker meaning. Again, 
this is in principle a legitimate way to carve up one’s domain of study. 
But it does presume that listeners can objectively infer speaker mean-
ing, without being in any way, at any given moment in processing, 
contaminated by their own perspective. In the domain of referen-
tial communication, such presumptions have been heavily debated 
(Keysar et al. 2003; Barr 2008; Hanna & Tanenhaus 2004), and the 
general answer seems that although people are very good at taking 
the other person’s perspective into account, it is difficult to completely 
shut out ones own. More generally, one can ask whether the brain is 
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really all that good in keeping its own needs and views crisply sepa-
rate from those of others, at all times. Everyday experience, as well 
as recent scientific analyses (Marcus 2008; Gigerenzer 2007), simply 
suggest it isn’t. Even our allegedly highly objective visual perception 
system – I believe it when I see it – appears to be contaminated by per-
sonal relevance right from the start (Barrett & Bar 2009). Pragmatics 
as a theoretical linguistic affair may be able to ignore that. But for 
experimental pragmaticists interested in actual processing, things 
may not be that easy.
The ERP study discussed above dealt with concepts such as 
abortion and euthanasia. Along with things like kindness and cru-
elty, they qualify as so-called “thick concepts” (Williams 1985), whose 
meaning has both a non-trivial descriptive and a non-trivial evalua-
tive component. Of course, the interesting twist in the example study 
is that unlike kindness (which is presumably universally approved 
of), the evaluative component of something like euthanasia wildly dif-
fers across individuals, as a function of one’s moral-ethical value sys-
tem. But I suspect matters are even more complex, in that we’re prob-
ably looking at a continuum where every concept can have an affec-
tive component to its meaning, with its nature and import depending 
on the specific person and situation. Take public speaking, computer, 
mortgage, skiing, or baby. None of these would qualify as traditional 
thick concepts. But, depending on the context, all of them can have 
mild or strong affective connotations that can be taken to be part of 
the meaning of the concept for us in that context. Because context-
dependent affective connotations resist formal semantic analysis (but 
see Jackendoff 2007, for a useful framework), one can look upon this 
as epiphenomenal. However, the very same connotations often dictate 
our behavior, causing us to avoid or instead seek occasions where we 
can speak publicly, and to avoid or instead look for skiing and babies 
in our lives. If that isn’t meaningful, then what is?
3.3. Valence and experimental pragmatics
Apart from valence being part of meaning anyway, there are 
other reasons why pragmaticists would do wise to at least consider 
valence and the affect system as relevant to their concerns. First, 
one can make a reasonable – if not by itself compelling – systems 
design argument, going like this: (a) All those fancy brain systems 
for perception, memory, decision and action are there to help us do 
the right thing; (b) language and the “interaction engine” upon which 
it rests (Levinson 2006; Tomasello 2008) is an evolutionarily recent 
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addendum that greatly amplifies the power of this control system, 
by exploiting, reconfiguring, and possibly incrementing its older com-
ponents with a discrete, extendable and transmissable scheme for 
conceptual and social coordination; (c) valence and affect are at the 
very heart of this control system, ‘igniting’ it with strong preferences 
and action tendencies and pervading all sorts of ‘cold’ representa-
tional processing (Barrett & Bar 2009; Damasio 1994; Dolan 2002; 
Vuilleumier & Huang 2009); and (d) hence, it makes sense to expect 
rich and interesting interconnections between the affective core of the 
control system and the communicative and linguistic systems that 
amplify its power.
Second, and consistent with this idea, language and commu-
nication are already clearly interfacing with valence and affect. As 
discussed in the previous section, one obvious way to ‘ignite’ cold rep-
resentational processing is to have valence and other aspects of affect 
as proper components of meaning. Here, I want to draw attention to 
several other critical observations: 
•  Language use is an instance of social interaction, and the lat-
ter is simply drenched in valence and affect. We like people or we 
don’t, we happily or reluctantly engage in specific social interactions, 
and we carefully manage our social network. Such things also code-
termine the pragmatics of language use. For example, speakers tailor 
the specificity of their referring expressions to mark social-affective 
relations (Enfield 2006). More generally, with each instance of lan-
guage use requiring joint commitment to a common project at sev-
eral levels (Clark 1996), the management of feelings about the project 
(e.g., face management) simply must be central to the endeavor. 
Moreover, according to Tomasello (2008), one of the three main goals 
of communication is simply to ‘share’, and to as such feel united and 
good together.
• Presumably related, language itself has an important extra-
lexical ‘channel’ via which affective matters can be conveyed, regu-
lated, and shared: prosody. Intonation can be used to express such 
attitudes as happy surprise, total disinterest, pride, compassion and 
defiance, and, in irony, it can even signal that the lexically conveyed 
meaning must be negated. Timing plays a critical role too. If you ask 
somebody whether he or she liked your presentation, for example, 
a long hesitation before the first word can say more than a million 
words. And then there are all these other ‘paralinguistic’ channels 
that co-define the communicative move: posture, facial expression, co-
speech gesture. All these channels can do obvious work at the affec-
tive level, probably in part as additional signs with valenced contents 
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(i.e., like emotion words; see below), but probably also partly in a way 
that is more intricately intertwined with the very process of commu-
nication itself.
• Finally, a more specific observation pertaining to mood. 
Experimental pragmatics is interested in how people use idiosyn-
cratic context and inferential heuristics to construct speaker mean-
ing. Evidence from research on attention, memory, decision mak-
ing, and social judgement that background mood can substantially 
modulate how the brain uses context and heuristics in information 
processing (Clore & Huntsinger 2007) is therefore directly relevant 
to the endeavor. In line with findings in these other domains, recent 
evidence from our lab (De Goede et al. 2009) suggests that whereas 
something like David praised Linda because… leads people to rap-
idly anticipate more information about Linda when they are in a 
good mood, a sad mood can completely abolish this type of heuristic 
anticipation. Interestingly, in the same study, syntactic parsing was 
unaffected by mood, showing that the mood-induced decline in heu-
ristic anticipation is not caused by a simple failure to attend. In line 
with other results (Rowe et al. 2007), we suspect that mood affects the 
breadth of rapid semantic memory retrieval, regulating the degree to 
which more remote conceptual information can be brought to bear on 
real-time processing. It is not difficult to see that such a mechanism 
can greatly affect the context-sensitive processing that is central to 
pragmatic inferencing. 
3.4. Multiple interfaces between language and valence
Based on considerations about what the brain is for, as well as 
on several other observations, I have argued that valence and the 
affect system should be of central interest to experimental pragmat-
ics. However, I think it would be wrong to assume that there is a sin-
gle interface to be studied. As we’ve seen, affect plays a role in com-
municative contents as well as in the mechanisms of communication 
itself, and this is most likely not a unified phenomenon. The influence 
of mood on heuristic inferencing brings in a third angle: ‘incidental’ 
affective factors that have nothing to do with contents or the joint 
communicative project can nevertheless modulate the processes that 
support context-dependent communication, via how they modulate 
basic brain functions relevant to a whole range of cognitive domains.
And it is not just the multifaceted nature of the language and 
communication system that makes things complex – the apparently 
simple concept of valence hides considerable complexity too. For 
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one, valence is not a unidimensional phenomenon, as partly differ-
ent neural systems deal with good and bad (cf., Cacioppo et al. 2004; 
Davidson & Irwin 1999; Dolan 2002), in sometimes orthogonal ways. 
Furthermore, valence itself is just one aspect of our affect system, a 
system capable of generating highly complex emotions. So, although 
the language system and the affect system can at some level be 
described as single systems, each has considerable internal com-
plexity, allowing for multiple points (and different types) of contact 
between the two.
4. Conclusions 
Experimental pragmatics asks how people construct contextual-
ized meaning in communication. The central message of this paper 
is that if experimental pragmatics ‘goes neuro’, it should at least 
occasionally go beyond the instrumental use of EEG or fMRI, as well 
as beyond the modestly ontological neuro- approach that involves 
mapping classic theoretical distinctions onto Brodmann areas. 
Understandably, the experimental pragmaticist’s view on processing 
has been heavily shaped by how, over the last few decades, cognitive 
psychologists and cognition-minded philosophers have tended to view 
the mind: as an information-processing machine that uses each bit 
of input, as it arrives, to piece together accurate mental representa-
tions of the environment (for downstream affect and further action, 
of course). But if we take a deep ontological ‘neuro’ perspective and 
ask about general principles of brain functioning in the light of what 
the brain is for, what seems immediately relevant here is that the 
brain evolved as a control system that helps its bearer negotiate a 
highly complex, rapidly changing and often not so friendly environ-
ment. In this environment, the ability to predict current unknowns, 
and to rapidly tell good from bad, are essential ingredients of process-
ing – without it, we’d all be dead. Now, pragmaticists are not going to 
die if they ignore the pragmatics of the brain in their accounts of how 
contextualized meaning is constructed. But they are going to miss 
out on something vital. If the brain is a continuously highly proactive 
and strongly valence-controlled system, it may not be wise to treat 
it as a dispassionate scientist reactively puzzling over what it all 
means.
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Dutch Science Foundation (016.008.021).
1 The difference between a modest and a fully ontological neuro- approach is 
to some extent a matter of degree. However, as individual scientists, projects, or 
subfields gradually move from simply mapping classic cognitive science theories 
onto Brodmann areas towards thinking more deeply about the nature of the brain, 
something important does change along the way: rather than viewing the brain 
as the physical device upon which the theory must be projected (a remnant of the 
‘mere neural implementation’ perspective), the brain is viewed as the device that 
the theory is about. 
2 We did not focus on the immediate response to words like euthanasia or homo-
sexual for two reasons. One is a practical one: whereas ERP analysis requires a 
single focused critical word, most of our statements depended on complex concepts 
whose specification was distributed across a number of words (e.g., Watching TV 
to relax, or The increasing emancipation of women). The second and deeper rea-
son was that we were interested in how value systems affected the construction 
of compositional meaning. Measuring ERPs at evaluative words like acceptable, 
wrong or easy, whose semantic contribution critically depends on the unfolding 
statement meaning, was thus more appropriate.
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